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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 96-1638 
 
QUEEN CITY PIZZA, INC.; THOMAS C. BOLGER; SCALE 
PIZZA, INC.; BAUGHANS, INC.; CHARLES F. BUCK; F.M. 
PIZZA, INC.; ROBERT S. BIGELOW; BLUE EARTH 
ENTERPRISES, INC.; KEVIN BORES; DAVIS PIZZA 
ENTERPRISES, INC.; DIANE A. DAVIS; FISHER PIZZA, 
INC.; JAMES B. FISHER, JR.; SEPCO, INC.; S&S PIZZA 
CORP.; G&L PIZZA CO.; STEPHEN D. GALLUP; LUGENT 
PIZZA, INC.; JOSEPH J. LUGENT; BILLIO'S PIZZA, INC.; 
WILLIAM J. MURTHA; SPRING GARDEN PIZZA, INC.; 
BRAD L. WALKER; JRW PIZZA, INC.; JAMES R. WOOD, 
Individually and as Class Representatives of a Class 
Consisting of All Present and Certain Former Domino's 
Franchisees in the United States; INTERNATIONAL 
FRANCHISE ADVISORY COUNCIL, INC. 
 
v. 
 
DOMINO'S PIZZA, INC. 
 
       Queen City Pizza, Inc.; Thomas C. 
       Bolger; Scale Pizza, Inc.; Baughans, 
       Inc.; Charles F. Buck; F.M. Pizza, Inc.; 
       Robert S. Bigelow; Blue Earth 
       Enterprises, Inc.; Kevin Bores; Davis 
       Pizza Enterprises, Inc.; Diane A. Davis; 
       Fisher Pizza, Inc.; James B. Fisher, Jr.; 
       SEPCO, Inc.; S&S Pizza, Inc.; G&L 
       Pizza, Inc.; Stephen D. Gallup; Lugent 
       Pizza, Inc.; Joseph J. Lugent; Billio's 
       Pizza, Inc.; William J. Murtha; Spring 
       Garden Pizza, Inc.; Brad L. Walker; 
       JRW Pizza, Inc.; James R. Wood; and 
       International Franchise Advisory 
       Council, Inc., 
 
       Appellants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-03777) 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, 
BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, 
SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS, 
McKEE and LAY,* Circuit Judges 
 
ORDER 
 
The petition for rehearing filed by appellants in the 
above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges 
who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the 
other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active 
service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having 
asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of 
the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, 
the petition for rehearing by the panel and the Court in 
banc, is denied. Chief Judge Sloviter and Judges Becker, 
Mansmann, Nygaard and Roth would grant rehearing. 
 
       BY THE COURT, 
 
/s/ Anthony J. Scirica 
Circuit Judge 
Dated: October 27, 1997 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Donald P. Lay, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Eighth Judicial Circuit, who sat by designation, as to panel rehearing 
only. 
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, Statement Sur Denial of the Petition 
for Rehearing. 
 
The majority opinion's interpretation of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) has serious consequences 
for our future examination of franchisor/franchisee 
relationships in the context of the antitrust laws. The 
majority states that 
 
       Kodak does not hold that the existence of information 
       and switching costs alone, such as those faced by the 
       Domino's franchisees, renders an otherwise invalid 
       relevant market valid. 
 
Queen City Pizza, Inc., et al. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 
96-1638. Slip op. at 16. Instead the majority believes that 
the ratio decidendi of the Kodak case is that the 
aftermarket commodity or service alleged to constitute a 
single brand market must be unique. Slip op. at 15-16. 
When this view is combined with the majority's further 
holding that uniqueness must come from the nature of the 
product, not the franchise agreement, slip op. at 13-14, the 
result is that the franchisor/franchisee relationship is 
rendered virtually immune from antitrust scrutiny. 
 
Judge Lay's splendid dissenting opinion fully exposes the 
flaws in the majority's relevant product market analysis, 
and I need not labor the point. I do, however, write 
separately to elucidate a concern about the majority's 
approach to antitrust policy in the franchising area that 
Judge Lay discusses only briefly, slip op. at 34-35, but 
which also strongly counsels that this case be heard en 
banc. 
 
I have long believed that "The way you come out in [a] 
case depends on how you go in." See Larry Muko, Inc. v. 
Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 
1368, 1377 (3d Cir. 1979)(Aldisert, J., dissenting). The 
majority's holdings stem, I believe, from how it has gone 
into the case, i.e. from the fact that the majority has bought 
into the oft-heard paeans of praise for franchising: 
 
       Franchising is a bedrock of the American economy. 
       More than one third of all dollars spent in retailing 
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       transactions in the United States are paid to franchise 
       outlets. We do not believe the antitrust laws were 
       designed to erect a serious barrier to this form of 
       business organization. 
 
Queen City Pizza, Inc., et al. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 
96-1638. Slip op. at 18. It also has endorsed the 
questionable theory that the kind of tying arrangements 
involved here "are an essential and important aspect of the 
franchise form of business organization." Id. But these 
theories are also flawed. 
 
I believe that the approach endorsed by the majority 
might have been acceptable two decades ago, see Ungar v. 
Dunkin' Donuts, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), when 
franchising was in its nascent, or at least its growing stage. 
But now the food franchisors are leviathans, and I am 
underwhelmed by the suggestion that they may be 
permitted with impunity to perpetuate the type of 
arrangements pled in the complaint. These arrangements 
are clearly quite onerous to the average franchisee, a 
relatively small business person whose sunk costs in the 
franchise represent all or most of his or her assets and who 
lacks the considerable resources necessary to switch or 
defranchise. Moreover, the amount of commerce that the 
franchisors are foreclosing in the tied product market -- for 
the pizza sauce, flour and other supplies (for which non- 
franchisor dominated suppliers, be they individualfirms or 
a franchise cooperative, could easily meet quality control 
specifications) is enormous. 
 
Additionally, to the extent that the plaintiffs have alleged 
coercion in connection with their acceptance of a 
burdensome tie, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal would be 
inconsistent with Ungar. Indeed, even if the majority's legal 
position is correct, it can only be sustained if it were an 
affirmance of a summary judgment on a full record, which 
is how the opinion seems to read. It can not stand under its 
actual procedural status -- review of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc. 
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A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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